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The Battle of Morgarten in 1315:
An Essential Incident in the Founding of the Swiss State
by
Albert Winkler
Political realities in the German Empire at the beginning of the
fourteenth century were harsh, and communities that wanted to gain or
maintain their autonomy had to deal with serious external threats. Most
frequently, this meant that military success was essential for survival. Many
forces vied for authority, influence, and domination over the regions that
formed the Swiss Confederation, which later developed into the modern
state of Switzerland. The largest threat to Swiss sovereignty in this period
was factions of nobles, most importantly the house of Habsburg, which
were expanding their control over the region. By the early fourteenth
century, the states of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden had been cooperating
with each other for decades to resist outside forces, and their resolve to
retain their autonomy was severely tested in 1315 when a large Habsburg
army came to plunder and subjugate these states. The sovereignty of the
Swiss republics was clearly at stake, and the significant victory in the battle
of Morgarten meant that they would survive and continue to develop their
own national expression. 1 This success probably kept the modern cantons
of Switzerland from being little more than the nearby Austrian provinces of
the Voralberg and Tirol. The achievement at Morgarten was also significant
in a social sense because it was an early victory of free peasants, which
allowed them to keep their liberties and independence in the face of
challenges from the feudal forces that attempted to control them. 2 This
1

Morgarten has attracted much scholarly attention. Important studies include, Carl
Amgwerd, "Die Schlacht und das Schlachtfeld von Morgarten," Mitteilungen des
Historischen Ve reins des Kantons Schwyz 49 (1951 ): 1-222; Bruno Meyer, "Die Schlacht
am Morgarten: Verlauf der Schlacht und Absichten der Parteien," Schweizerische Zeitschrift
far Geschichte 16 ( 1966): 129-79; and Wilhelm Sidler, Die Schlacht am Morgarten (Ziirich:
Ore II FiiB!i, 1910).
2
Collections of primary sources on the battle include: Theodor von Liebenau, ed. "Berichte
iiber die Schacht am Morgarten," Mitteilungen des Historischen Ve reins des Kantons Schwyz
3 (1884): 1-86 and W. Oechsli Die Anfiinge der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft: zur
sechsten Siikularfeier des ersten ewigen Bundes vom I. August I 29 I (Zurich: Ulrich & Co.,
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article will address the development of the early Swiss to 1315 and
demonstrate how political and social realities Jed to war. This essay will
also analyze the battle of Morgarten by a careful use of the primary sources
to clarify many aspects of the engagement.
Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden were the first members of the Swiss
Confederation. Often referred to as the "Forest States" or "Forest Cantons"
(Waldstiitte), these small communities were struggling for their autonomy
as they faced external threats. During much of the late Middle Ages, Uri
and Schwyz were part of the Zurich di strict over which the Habsburg family
had authority. While the people of these states were largely free peasants
and often chose their own leaders, the Habsburgs still held judicial powers
over them and could arbitrate or pass judgment on their activities, especially
dealing with foreign relations. A major step toward self-rule for the Swiss
was the granting of charters of independence (Freibrief or Freheitsbrief) for
both Uri and Schwyz by the Hohenstaufen Emperors of Germany, Henry
VII and Frederick II. Henry conferred this concession to Uri in 1231 and
Frederick gave it to Schwyz in I 240. These endowments affirmed that the
states were under the authority of the Emperor (Reichsunmittelbar or
Reichsfrei) making them independent from the local feudal powers
including the Habsburgs, but thi s sovereignty had to be put into practice,
and many issues remained unresolved.-1 While Uri retained this status,
Schwyz and the Habsburg family engaged in a lengthy contest relating to
judicial authority, even though that state controlled much of its domestic
affairs, and it became the most militant power in resisting the Habsburg
threat to the independence of the Forest States.
More than a century later, the Bernese chronicler, Conrad Justinger,
presented quaint details on the oppression of the people of Schwyz by the
Habsburg rulers. Justinger claimed the Habsburg overlords (amt/Ute) placed
over the peasants acted in a "completely outrageous" (g ar frevenlich)
manner by abusing "pious people, wives, daughters, and young women, and
[the overlords] wanted to force their immoral desires [on them] ," causing
the people to rebel. 4 While this account certainly made the Schwyzers
1891 ), pp. 206*-l 9*. The * desi gnates the page numbers of sources in the appendix.
3
Wilhelm Oechsli ed. Quellen zur Schweizergeschichte (Zlirich: Schulthess, 1918), pp. 40,
41.
4
Conrad Justinger, Die Berne r-Ch ronik (Bern: Wyss, 1871 ), p. 46. "Ouch warent die
amptliite gar frevenlich genfromen /iit, wiben, tochtern und jungfrowen , und wolten iren
mutwillen mil gewalt triben, da z aber die erben liite die lengen nit ve rtragen mochten; und
sassten sich also wider die amptliite." See also, Richard Feller and Edgar Bonjour,
Geschichtschreibung der Schweiz: vom Spatmittelalter zur Neuzeit (Basel : Helbing &
Lichtenhahn, 1979), pp. 7- 1 1. Ju stinger wrote near the year 1420.
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appear to be virtuous and innocent victims, Justinger clearly exaggerated.
The communities of Schwyz commonly elected their own local leaders, and
there were few if any Habsburg overseers nearby to abuse the people on
such a personal level.
The contest between the Swiss and the Habsburgs also dealt with
personal liberties because the peasants were trying to get and maintain
broader privileges. At that time, there were sharp distinctions between the
peasants who were free and unfree. The serfs were held in bondage, they
owned no land, were tied to the manor, and could even be sold with it. They
owed service without payment to the landowner, and the lord controlled
local justice in the manorial court. Serfs even had to get permission from
the lord to marry. Critically, the nobles held the right to provide military
protection, and those in bondage could not perform this vital function. The
authority to defend the state was a necessary step toward individual liberties
and the independence of society and the state. In fact, the right to bear arms
was often the most obvious privilege which separated the free from the
unfree. The free peasants could also leave the service of the landowner and
appeal to higher courts thus circumventing local manorial justice to look for
fairer judgments to their petitions. 5 The peasants coveted these rights, and
those who enjoyed them wanted to keep and protect them from any threat.
The people of Schwyz enjoyed more freedoms than those of the other
Forest States, but the residents of Uri also maintained many liberties even
though some of them owed loyalty to local landowners and church men.
The opening of the St. Gotthard Pass over the Alps, probably in 1236, made
Uri an important station on a major trade route, and the community charged
tolls and transportation fees, enhancing its wealth and importance. In
contrast, much of the land in Unterwalden was owned by persons living
outside the area, and comparatively few free peasants lived there. While
many of these people still owed service to lords and church estates, they
were clearly agitating for liberties such as those enjoyed by their sister
states nearby. 6
The Habsburg family tried to assert control over Schwyz and the other
Forest States by a policy of encirclement. One method was to control trade.
Count Rudolf III von Habsburg, the Silent (der Schweigsame ), constructed
the fortress of Neuhabsburg from 1241 to 1244 on the shores of Lake
Luzern on a prominence between Luzern and Kiissnacht to control
'Friedrich von WyB, "Die Freien Bauern, Freiamter, Freigerichte und die Vogteien der
Ostschweiz im spateren Mittelalter," Zeitschriftfiir schweizerisches Recht 18 ( 1873): 19-184
and Paul Schweizer, "Die Freiheit der Schwyzer," Jahrbuchfiir Schweizerische Geschichte
10 (1885): 2-25.
6
Sidler, Morf?w·ten. pp. 32-41.

6

Review

[November

commerce by that route. The Emperors Rudolf I von Habsburg, who
reigned from 1273 to 1291, and his son, Albrecht I, who ruled from 1297
to 1307, followed this policy. Wielding the combined power of the
Habsburg faction and the Imperial prerogatives, they extended their
influence on the approaches to the Forest States by acquiring literally
dozens of towns, areas, and courts by many means, including inheritance
and purchase, thus effectively controlling access to the Forest States from
the east, north, and west. Among the areas gained by Rudolf was the city of
Zug, from which the Habsburg army would march on Schwyz in 1315.
Equally important was the purchase of Interlaken by Albrecht in 1306 that
was also an assembly point from which the Habsburgs launched their attack
on Unterwalden at the same time as the invasion of Schwyz. Also
significant was Rudolf's extension of control over the monastery of
Einsiedeln in 1283. 7 The people of Schwyz and the Forest States took the
threats very seriously, and began a vigorous policy in 1293 of small-scale
warfare to thwart Habsburg interests. 8 During wars and other international
crises, these impediments threatened the Swiss states.
The Forest States also looked to each other for mutual support and
protection politically and militarily. 9 An undated document, written perhaps
between 1244 and 1252, mentioned an agreement between Luzern and the
towns ofBuochs and Stans, both in Unterwalden. 10 Pope Innocent IV wrote
a letter on 28 Aug. 1247 condemning a pact between Schwyz, Luzern, and
Sarnon, a town in Unterwalden. The Holy Father was supporting a plea by
Count Rudolf III von Habsburg who claimed that he owned these areas, and
he feared they were operating autonomously. Innocent angrily criticized this
agreement because it aided Emperor Frederick II with whom the Pope was
then at war. 11

7

Sidler, pp. 44, 48-54.
lbid., pp. 114-5.
9
0n the question of early treaties among the Forest States, see W. Oechsli, Die Anflinge der
Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft:; two works by Bruno Meyer, Die Altesten
Eidgenbssischen Bunde: Neue Untersuchungen uber die Anflinge der Schweizerischen
Eidgenossenschaft (Zi.irich: Rentsch, 1938); and "Die Entstehung der Eidgenossenschaft:
Der Stand der heutigen Anschauungen," Schweizerische Zeitschrift.fUr Geschichte 2 ( 1952):
153- 205. Sec also Karl Meyer "Der Ursprung der Eidgenossenschaft," Zeitschrifi .fUr
schweizerische Geschichte 21 (1941) 3: 285-652.
10
J. E. Kopp, ed. Urkunden zur Geschichte der eidgeniissischen Bunde (Lucern: Meyer,
1835), pp. 2-3. Kopp reproduced the document and presented his case for its date in a
footnote.
11
"Breve des Papstes Innocenz IV. gegen Schwyz, Sarnen und Luzern. Lyon 28 August
1247" as cited in Wilhelm Oechsli, ed. Quellenbuch zur Schweizergeschichte (Zi.irich:
Schulthess, 1918), pp. 43-4. This is a translation of the document from Latin into German.
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Future members of the Swiss Confederation entered into at least one
agreement in 1291. Since the Federal Charter (Bundesbriej) of August 1291
may be a forgery, 12 the first authentic pact of that year was endorsed by
Zurich, Uri, and Schwyz on 16 Oct. 1291. These states designed the
agreement to last three years, but it became invalid when the Habsburgs
defeated Zurich in 1292, and the city had to come to terms with its
adversaries, losing its ability to act independently . 13 Zurich later sent troops
to support the Habsburg forces at the battle of Morgarten. Ironically, the
best interest of the city in the long term rested with a victory of its
adversaries in that engagement.
Long before the encounter at Morgarten, the men of Schwyz
demonstrated significant military ability, and the statements by early
historians of the battle that the Schwyzers were either "defenseless"
(inermem) or "untrained at arms" (armis inexercitatam) were incorrect. 14
The Emperor Rudolf I hired mercenaries from that state, and these men
participated in the siege of Besarn;on in 1289. The men from Schwyz were
"accustomed to moving rapidly in the mountains," and they dealt a decisive
blow to the city defenders in an impressive feat of arms by "attacking down
a mountain." 15 The men of Schwyz again showed this skill in maneuvering
in steep terrain before the battle of Morgarten, and they also won that
contest by an attack downhill. Rudolf was so impressed "that the king
[Rudolf] awarded them [the Schwyzers] a red banner of the Holy Roman
Empire; that is all the emblems ... of the holy martyrs of our Lord Jesus
Christ." 16 This was a red banner with a white Christian symbol on it, which

12
See Roger Sablonier, "Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft im 15. Jahrhundert: Staatlichkeit,
Politik und Selbstverstandnis," in Die Enstehung der Schweiz: vom Bundesbrie.f 1291 zur
Nationalen Geschichtskultur des 20. Jahrhunderts (Schwyz: Historischer Yerein des
Kantons Schwyz, 1999). Christoph Pfister, Bern und die alten Eidgenossen: Die Entstehung
der Schwyze r Eidgenossenscha.ft im Lichte der Geschichtskritick, (Norderstedt: Dillum,
2006) and hi s "Der Bundesbrief von 1291 : Kritik einer Gefalschten Urkunde,"
www .dillum .dh/html/bundesbrief_l 291 _kritik.htm
13
"Rat und Blirger von Zlirich schliessen mit Landammannem und Landleuten von Uri und
Schwyz ein dreijahriges Biindnis, einer gegen jedermann zu helfen, 1291 Oktober 16."
Urkundenbuch der Stadt und Landscha.ft Zurich (Zlirich: Hohr, 1888-[ 1957]), 6: 150-1. See
also Oechsli , Quellenbuch, pp. 49-50 and Anton Largiader, Geschichte von Stadt und
Landschaft Ziirich (Zlirich: Rentsch, 1945), p. 86.
1
4The quotes are from Peter von Zittau and Johann von Yictring respectively as cited in
Liebenau, "Berichte," pp. 23 and 24.
is..soliti currere in montanis" and "descendentes montem irruerunt," Mathias von
Neuenburg, Die Chronik des Mathias van Neuenburg, Adolf Hofmeister, ed. (Berlin:
Weidmann, 1955), p. 41.
16
"daz inen der kiing gab an ir roten paner daz heilig rich, daz isl alle waffen ... der heiligen
marter unseres herrenjesu Christi," Justinger, Berner-Chronik, p. 46.
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the Schwyzers carried at Morgarten, and red and white later became the
colors of the entire Swiss Nation. 17
The attacks by the Schwyzers on the monastery of Einsiedeln further
demonstrated their martial abilities shortly before the battle of Morgarten.
A controversy over control of the monastery at Einsiedeln led to increased
tensions between the Habsburgs and Schwyz because that noble family
provided protection for the convent. In a "boundary dispute"
(Marchenstreit), Schwyz and Einsiedeln had contested the ownership of
important lands since the tenth century, and the controversy was only
solved in 1394 when Schwyz achieved formal control of the religious
community. The people of Schwyz believed that much of the wealth of
Einsiedeln belonged to them, which justified taking the monastery's
goods. 18
In 1307, the Schwyzers
launched a series of assaults on the
cloister, and the official list of
complaints (Klagerodel) about
these raids , written by the monks
in 131 l , gave insights into how
the men of Schwyz waged war.
The men of Schwyz broke into
stalls and plundered storage
facilities taking food, horses, and
cattle, and they also killed a few
monks while abusing others. Even
though the attackers assaulted
largely defenseless friars, the
Schwyzers deployed their forces
with careful military efficiency,
and they almost always came at
night meaning they were able to
march and deploy after dark. Of
the thirty attacks listed, five
involved 100 men , two included Men of Schwyz taking cattle from the
monastery of Einsiedeln durin g the Border
200 men, and six contained 300 Dispute.
men. The men were under military
leadership and came with banners
flying. Two officers were often over each group of 100, and the overall
17

For an extensive work on Swi ss flags see, A. and B. Bruckner, eds. Schweizer Fahnenbuch,
(St. Gallen: Zollikofer, 1942).
18
Andreas Ri ggenbach, Der Marchenstreit zwischen Schwyz und Einsiedeln und die
E111stehung der Eidgenossenschafi (Zurich : Fretz und Wasmuth, 1965).
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leader of the state (Landammann) was frequently in charge of the raids.
These numbers indicated the Schwyzers used tactical units of I 00 men, but
they also deployed smaller groups because the monks observed detachments
of 20 and 30 men on one occasion. These smaller formations indicated a
greater tactical flexibility because units of 100 were probably more
cumbersome to deploy under various circumstances. 19
Rudolf von Radegg, a monk at Einsiedeln, witnessed one of the most
significant raids on the monastery on the night of 6 and 7 January 1314 and
wrote an account of it. The men of Schwyz marched from their homes for
hours on a route that took them past the mountain of Morgarten in the dark
and cold of the winter night. This force included some men on horseback
and was the entire military strength of the state. The men of Schwyz
attacked at midnight and showed great military efficiency . They divided
their forces and surrounded the religious community, making sure that no
one could escape, and advanced simultaneously to seize the monastery. The
Schwyzers took much that was valuable, including books and cattle, and
burned every document they could find, obviously hoping to destroy
anything that might support the monks' claims to ownership of the land.
Foreseeing this possibility, the abbot had hidden the most important
manuscripts before the Schwyzers attacked, and these significant items
survived. The troops took nine monks captive to Schwyz including Rudolf
where they remained under the hospitality of a local priest until the
Habsburgs negotiated their release eleven weeks later. 20 These prisoners
were noblemen, and they were probably freed on the payment of a ransom.
While attacking defenseless monks required little military skill, these
actions provide valuable insights into the ability of the men of Schwyz to
deploy before the battle of Morgarten. The route from Schwyz to Einsiedeln
led past the road going to Zug along the base of the Morgarten mountain.
As was the case in 1315 when the troops deployed for the battle, it would
have been easy for the Schwyzers to tum onto the road to Zug, follow it a
short distance, and take positions on the slopes of the hill. Equally
significant, the men of Schwyz had shown they were skilled at coordinated
efforts at night and in cold weather, which were essential abilities in their
victory at Morgarten.
The attacks on Einsiedeln were clearly provocative to the Habsburgs,
and this aggressiveness was part of Schwyz' s foreign policy that led to war.
The Schwyzers had also become more hostile to Einsiedeln because the
19
" Klagerodel : 1311, nach Marz 14-Juni 19," Der Geschichtsfreund: Mitteilungen des
Historischen Vereins der fiinf Orte Luzern, Uri, Schwyz, Underwalden Ob und Nid dem
Wald und Zug 43(1888): 345-59.
20
Rudolf von Radegg, "Uberfall Einsiedelns durch die Schwizer. 6.-7. Januar 1314," as cited
in Oechsli, Quellenbuch, ( 190 I), pp. 261-73.
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attempts at arbitration had gone against them. Finally, Gerhard von Bevar
(ruled 1307-18), the Bishop of Constance, placed the interdict on Schwyz
for its belligerence and for its refusal to pay compensation for damages. But
Church sanctions changed little politically, and the people of that state were
so outraged by the ban that the bishop's emissaries dared not read the
official statement in Schwyz for fear of violence. 21
The Schwyzers also prepared for hostilities by building border defenses.
Uri's location between the other two Forest States left it largely
invulnerable to direct assault, but Schwyz and Unterwalden were subject to
invasion.The mountainous terrain restricted the avenue of approach to these
two states, and their people secured various routes of possible attack by
building border fortifications "walls and trenches" called Letzi, from Letze
(border defense). 22
The Schwyzers built these defenses shortly before the battle. Most
likely, these people constructed the Letzi at Rothenthurm in 1310 to protect
the route from Einsiedeln. Rudolf von Radegg mentioned the wall at
Rothenthurm when he was taken captive to Schwyz in 1314. "We came to
the place where the defensive walls had been constructed." 23 The
fortifications there included a wall approximately 1 meter (3 feet) thick and
3 to 5 meters (I 0 to 16 feet) high. The barrier was about 400 to 450 meters
(440 to 500 yards), and it also supported two towers. 24 The Schwyzers build
the defenses at Brunnen near the same time because they were in place in
1315 before the battle. These barriers protected against potential attacks by
land and by boat across Lake Luzern and included palisades, which were
poles driven into the shores of the lake to block landings by water. The
walls on land were also about JO to 16 feet (3 to 5 meters) high and 3 feet
(I meter) wide. 25

21

Sidler, pp. 62, 115.
Stefan Sonderegger, "Der Kampf an der Letzi: Zur Typologie des spatmittelalterlichen
Abwehrkampfes im Bereich von voralpinen Landwehren," Revue internationale d'histoire
militaire 65 ( 1988): 77-8. The contemporary historian, Johannes von Winterthur also called
them "walls and trenches" "muris etfossatis" Johannes von Winterthur, Johannis Vitodurani
Chronicon: Die Chronik des Minoriten Johannes von Winterthur Georg von Wyss
cd.(Ziirich: Hohr, 1856), p. 71.
23
" Venimus, in quo sunt moenia structa, loco ." Rudolf von Radegg as cited in A. Niischeler,
"Die Letzinen in der Schweiz," Mittheilungen der Antiquarischen Gesellschaft in Zurich 18
(1872) : 13.
24
Jost Biirgi , "Die Letzinen der Urkantone: ein Verteidigungssystem aus der Zeit der
Bundesgriindung," Mitteilungen des Historischen Ve reins des Kantons Schwyz 75 ( 1983):
35.
25
Sidler, pp. 117- 8.
22
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Border defenses at Rothenthurm as they appeared in 1790.

The defenses at Arth were among the most extensive. In L3 L4, the
Schwyzers built two lines of defen ses, in the lower part of the village
(Niederdorf), in and near Lake Zug to defend against any attacks by land or
water. They constructed pali sades in the shores of the lake that were
roughly 1000 meters ( 1100 yards) in length, and the walls on land were
probably 2.5 kilometers ( 1.5 miles) long.26 The barriers on land were
described as being about 12 feet high (12 Schuhe hoch) and 3 feet thick (3
Schuhe dick). They were well constructed out of stone and resembled the
wall of a castle, complete with a trench , 9 meters (30 feet) wide and 2
meters (6 feet) deep, dug along the front of the position to enhance its
effectiveness. The tops of the walls were irregular in configuration and
included merlons, which were so lid positions for protection, and
crenellations, that were the empty spaces between the merlon s from which
shots could be fired. At either end of these barricades, the natural obstacle
of den se forests helped protect thi s position from flank attack. Be lieving in
defense in depth, the Schwyzers also constructed another line of obstacles
in the upper village (Oberdorf) of Arth at the same time. 27

26

27

Map fac ing page 125 in Sidler and BUrgi, " Die Letzinen der Urkantone," p. 43 .
8Urgi, pp. 39-48.
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The people of Unterwalden also built defensive positions at this time,
mostly to protect them from attack across Lake Luzern. They constructed
the extensive palisades and walls defending Stansstad, Buochs, and
Beckenried about 1315, all on the shores of the lake.28 These extensive
fortifications constructed shortly before the battle of Morgarten
demonstrated that the people of Schwyz and Unterwalden, which were poor
countries with small populations, made significant sacrifices in funds and
effort to protect their lands from attack. Despite these impressive endeavors,
the Schwyzers either overlooked an important avenue of approach or simply
had too few resources to buttress it because they had failed to fortify the
road leading from Lake Aegeri (ii.gerisee) past the Morgarten Mountain into
Schwyz. This oversight gave the Habsburg army a relatively unobstructed
avenue of attack in 1315 . The Schwyzers fortified this point of entrance at
Hauptsee in 13 22 seven years after the battle. 29
The military ability of the Forest States was related to their manpower
because strength was partially a function of the number of men available for
service. The population of these states at that time cannot be determined
precisely, but each likely contained several thousand persons at most.
Certainly, no more than one quarter of the total population was an adult,
physically-fit male, and a reasonable estimate of the troop strength of
Schwyz, was 1200 to 1500 men. Military service began at age sixteen and
continued until the infirmities of old age precluded martial activities,
usually by age sixty. Sixteen was also the age at which young men were
legally adults. 30 The men of the Forest States had no uniforms at this time,
and they wore their usual peasant's clothing on campaigns. But they had
white crosses sewn into their clothing, either the shirt or the pants or both,
to distinguish them from their enemies.
There were hardly any social distinctions between the men in the army
of Schwyz because the community was comprised almost entirely of
peasants, and few if any knights participated in the battle on their side. In
his account of the battle, Justinger referred to groups of men he called
achter and einungerwho fought for Schwyz. Some historians have assumed
he meant men who were shock troops they called "banished" (Verbannten) ,
who led the Schwyzers into battle. These men were supposedly "criminals"
(Verbrecher) or "convicts" (Straflinge ). This interpretation is an error
derived from a misunderstanding of the terms achter and einunger in
28

Niischeler, "Letzinen," pp. 7-17 , [61] . See also Sidler, pp. 116-30.
Jost Biirgi , pp. 29-55 .
.it'Oechsli , p. 230. All men of Schwyz aged "sixteen years and above" (mansnamen xvi yarn
alt und da rob was) served indicating this was the age of military obli gation. Hans Fri.ind, Die
Chronik des Hans Frund, Landschreiber zu Schwytz Christian Immanuel Kind ed. (Chur:
Genge! , 1875), p. 48.
29
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Justinger' s account, which seemed to refer to some kind of lawbreaker:11 In
fact, those terms indicated these men were not criminals but were the best,
bravest, and most experienced troops available. 32 No doubt, such skillful
warriors were placed in the most critical point in the battle.
The principal weapon wielded by the men of the Forest States was the
halberd, a variation of the battle ax, that had an iron ax blade with a sharp
point on it. Often there was also a hook on the side opposite to the ax blade.
This metal accessory was attached to a wooden shaft 5 to 8 feet long, and
the weapon was light, versatile, and relatively inexpensive. The device was
used for stabbing and slashing, and, when the hook was available, it could
snag a knight 's armor and be used to pull him from his mount. Once on the
ground, a heavily armored cavalryman was out of his element and at a
disadvantage. Johannes von Winterthur wrote that the Schwyzers had these
"very terrible" weapons with which they could cut up their heavily-armored
enemies into pieces as though "with a razor." 33 The Schwyzers also wore
shoes with iron spikes affixed to them that made walking on the steep and
slippery slopes of mountains much easier giving them a considerable
advantage over their enemies on foot and horseback who had no such
devices.34
Some of the Swiss carried other weapons including daggers, but few if
any had crossbows or other arms that could shoot projectiles, yet they often
opened battle by throwing stones allowing them to do damage at a di stance.
The Habsburg knights on horseback and the foot soldiers who accompanied
them wielded the typical weapons used by well-equipped armies at that time
including swords, spears, and daggers. They also had defensive armament
such as helmets, shields, and chain mail pants and shirts. 35 The Habsburg
army was clearly formidable, and its soldiers were "the strongest, best
chosen, most battle experienced, most skillful, and most fearless [men]." 36
11

Justinger, p. 47.
Liebenau, pp. I0-15 and Sidler, pp. 182--4.
33
Johannes von Winterthur, Chronik, pp. 72-3 . " I/lo apellate helnhartam. valde terrihilia,
quibus adversarios firmissime armatos quasi cum novacula diviserullt et in frusta
conciderunt."
34
Ibid, p. 72. "lnstrumentis pedicis etferreis induit quihusfaciliter gressum vel i::radum in
terrafixeralll in montihus quantumcumque proclivis; inimicus et inimicorum equis minime
pedes suos sistere valentihus."
"Philipp Miiller, "Morgarten: ein Beitrag zur Waffen technik," Mitteilun gen des Historischen
Ve reins des Kan tons Schwyz 88 ( 1996): 23--40. Two works by Hugo Schneider also found
in the Mitteilungen, "Die Bewaffnung zur Zeit der Schlacht am Morgarten,"58 ( 1965):
37--49 and "Schwert und Dolch aus der Zeit der Schlacht am Morgarten, 1315 " 57 ( 1964 ):
137--46.
36
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 71 , "miliciam robustissimam et e/ectissimam et ad
pungnandum peritissimam et intrepidissimam."
32
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A Swiss with a halberd pulling a knight from his mount by E. Van Muyden

The conflict between the Forest States and the Habsburgs became part
of a war for the throne of Germany. In 1313, the Emperor Henry VII died,
and ambitious and powerful nobles soon vied for his position. Louis IV of
Bavaria (Ludwig the Bavarian) won this contest and was elected to the
throne in October 1314, but the Habsburg faction, led by Frederick I, the
Handsome (der Schone), disputed the election, and civil war ensued.
Frederick's younger brother, Leopold, supported his sibling's candidacy,
while the Forest States sought to weaken Habsburg influence by sustaining
Louis. The campaigning between Louis and Frederick in 13 LS was
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indecisive, but late in the year Leopold decided to invade the Forest States.
The supporters of Louis had already slowed their activities as winter
approached, but there was still time for Leopold to wage a rapid campaign
before the onset of harsh weather. A quick, decisive expedition against the
Swiss would remove the threat from the Forest States, and the subsequent
plundering of their lands would provide needed supplies and funds to help
sustain the Habsburg war effort. 37 In fact as Duke Leopold's army
advanced, his men carried "ropes and cords" (restes et Junes) with which to
lead away captured cattle. 38
Frederick and Leopold led a large army in the summer of 1315 believed
to be 20,000 men on foot and 1300 well-armed knights on horseback. 39 As
allies of the Habsburg faction, contingents of men from Zurich, Luzern,
Zug, and Glarus accompanied them. 40 Victory seemed assured for Duke
Leopold, if he could bring his impressive force to bear on the relatively
small number of Swiss troops. The best hope the Swiss states had for
success was to defeat the Habsburg army before it could be fully deployed
against them.
Leopold divided his forces for a two-pronged attack on the Forest States
from opposite directions. Count Otto von Strassberg led one of these
advances, and he assembled his force at Interlaken to strike at Unterwalden
from the southwest over the Briinig Pass. On the same day, 15 November
1315, the Duke led another army to invade Schwyz from the north. Striking
at the Forest States from two directions at the same time seemed to be a
good strategy because the Swiss would have difficulty meeting such threats,
but the Swiss enjoyed interior lines of communication, which meant they
could concentrate their forces on one army, and, if victorious, turn their
attention to the other. The size of the force the Duke led against Schwyz
was probably half the number of the two armies, and it included roughly
9,000 men on foot and on horseback. Among these were about 2000
mounted knights. 41
Fortunately, the badly-outnumbered Schwyzers received reinforcements
from their allies. Uri faced no immediate danger, since the enemy marched
only directly on Unterwalden and Schwyz, so Uri sent troops to the other
states. Unterwalden sent men to aid Schwyz as well, even though an army
also advanced on them, believing the defense of Schwyz was critical. The
17
Alois Niederstatter, Die Herrschaft Osterreich: Fiirst und Land im Spiitmittelalter (Wien:
Ueberreuter, 2001 ), pp. 120-l.
18
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 71.
39
lbid. pp. 70-1 . "circa mille trecentos equites galeatos vel ultra et circa XX milia peditum."
40
Justinger, p. 47.
41
Recent historians often accept the number of 9000 men among whom were 2000 knights.
Sidler, p. 153 and Hans Rudolf Kurz, Schweizerschlachten, (Bern: Francke, 1962), p. 8.
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contingents sent to Schwyz numbered 600, and these additional forces
played a key role in the battle. The combined Swiss forces reportedly
numbered 2000 men. 42

Battle of Morgarten by Diebold Schilling (the older) drawn in
1485. Leopold 's court jester is depicted at the left.

Conrad Justinger told a quaint story about Leopold's plans that
illuminated a potential problem with them. A court jester or fool (narre),
later believed to be Kuony (Kuoni) von Stocken, accompanied the army,
and Leopold asked how the plans pleased him. He answered, "not well."
When asked to explain, the jester responded, "because everyone has
counseled on how you will go into the land, [but] no one has explained how
you will return." 43 This story was probably apocryphal, but it indicated a
42

Justinger, p. 47 and Peter von Zittau ''./ere duo millia pugnantium," as cited in Liebenau,

p. 23 .
43

Justinger, p. 47, "Nu waz ein n.arre in dem here, der wart gefraget wie im der rat geviele?
Do sprach er, nit wol; do fragten si in: warumb im ir rate ubel geviele? Do antwurt er und
sprach: darumb da z ir a/le ge raten hand, wie ir in. da z Lant koment, es hat iiwer keiner
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potential weakness in the Duke's plans because no one considered the
possibility of failure and the potential need to escape.
The Swiss planned to ambush the Habsburg army when it advanced, but
a knowledge of when and where these forces would march was critical to
that attempt. When Leopold assembled his troops at Zug on 14 November
1315, he had only two logical directions of approach into Schwyz. He could
either advance along the shores of Lake Zug to attack the defenses at Arth,
or he could march past Lake Aegeri and use the unobstructed road that went
along the slopes of the Morgarten Mountain. Clearly, the route past
Morgarten was the easiest means of approach, and the Schwyzers may have
failed to fortify that area hoping to lure any attacking army into using that
avenue of march, but they had to be completely sure it was used. The early
historians of the battle have suggested that an intermediary or a traitor gave
the Swiss this vital information. Johannes von Winterthur mentioned that
the "count of Toggenburg" (de Toggenburg comitem), identified as
Friedrich von Toggenburg, was a mediator between Schwyz and Leopold
in negotiations to reach some kind of agreement. This effort failed , but
during the mediation, the Schwyzers learned by which direction the
Habsburg army would advance. 44 Conrad Justinger stated that a nobleman
named "von Htinenberg" shot an arrow over the fortifications towards the
Swiss with a note attached to it which read, "defend yourselves at
Morgarten." 45 This man, Hartman von Htinenberg, reportedly held the
people of Schwyz in high esteem.
These stories seemed plausible, but they remained uncertain, and other
explanations were also possible. Clearly, many men knew the route of
march, and Leopold's army may have been unable to keep a secret, meaning
that the intelligence might have leaked out by numerous sources. The
Schwyzers also used reconnaissance to discern their enemy's movements.
A man on horseback could cover many miles in a few hours, rapidly
bringing vital information on the activities of the Habsburg army. As one
chronicler asserted, the men of Schwyz learned of the enemy's approach by
"diligent scouting." 46 These scouts encamped on the road that led past the
Morgarten mountain, and "watched it [the passage] all day and night." 47 The
people of Schwyz established a ruse at Arth to fool Leopold into believing
geraten, wa ir ha1wider uskoment."
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 72. "Prescientes autem Switenses, per revelacionem comitis
memorati, se in ilia parte aggrendiendos."
45
Justinger, p. 47. "hiitend iich am morgarten."
46
Sebastian Seeman as cited in Liebenau, p. 42. "Speculatorium industria (qui tum forte ei
in loco peccorum armenta a bestiarum raptu tuebantur) premoniti, in loco memorato
Morgarte ei occurerunt."
47
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 72. "Et erant custodientes ea tota die et nocte."
44
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that their main forces were stationed at that fortified town. The people lit
watch fires on the walls of Arth, and young boys and women remained on
the barricades to give the impression that the walls were defended by men. 48
While the battle plans of Schwyz proved highly effective, the names of
the leaders who made them remain unknown. Konrad von Yberg of Schwyz
led at least two of the attacks on the monastery of Einsiedeln, and Werner
Stauffacher was the leader of the state (Landamman) in 1314, but the
commanders for 1315, when the battle took place, were unrecorded.
However, Stauffacher most likely led the men of Schwyz at Morgarten. The
overall leader of Uri for 1315 was Werner von Attinghusen (Attinghausen)
and the leaders ofUnterwalden that year were Heinrich von Zubon (Zuben)
and Klaus von Wizerlon (WiBerlon). 49
The Habsburg cavalry advanced ahead of the foot soldiers. The
mounted knights were clearly the most formidable part of the army, and the
impressive throw weight of a heavily armored man charging on horseback
was well known. The knights also had great disdain for the lower classes on
foot. These nobleman likely believed they had a score to settle with the
upstart peasants living in Schwyz, who had long resisted Habsburg
domination. The road was probably only wide enough to accommodate two
horses abreast, and the column of men on horseback could have stretched
a few miles along the road. The men on foot followed the advancing
cavalry, and this procession probably stretched for several miles as well.
Additionally, some of the troops came by boat across Lake Aegeri. One
vessel from Aarow (Aarau) held forty-five men. 50 The men of Schwyz and
their allies wisely directed their attack at the knights at the front of the
column. While the entire Habsburg army greatly outnumbered the Swiss,
at the point of engagement, the numbers involved on both sides were
probably about equal. Also, the attack on a mountain road meant that the
knights were incapable of mounting a charge, meaning they had lost their
main advantage in combat.
The Habsburg army marched on Schwyz early in the morning of 15
Nov. 1315, and its progress was aided by the light of the moon that was
only two days past full, but the brightness of the night also assisted the
Swiss when they deployed to meet their adversaries. Leopold's advance was
orderly and well planned despite one serious oversight. Apparently, he
made no effort to reconnoiter the line of march to learn if there were any
~ 8 Peter Villiger as cited in Oechsli, p. 217 *. ''Aliso hand sy von stundt an sich im ganzen

land versamlet, sind den niichsten gegen den Morgarten gezogen und zu Arth die frowen
Lassen die wacht ha/ten." See also, Rennward Cysat as cited in Liebenau, p. 72.
49
See " Klagerodcl," Der Geschicht.1ji·eund, 349-59 and letters to the leaders of Uri, Schwyz,
and Unterwalden as cited in Oechsli, pp. 197*- 198* and pp. 203*-204*.
50
Sprenger und Klingenberg as cited in Oechsli, pp. 215-6*.
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unforeseen obstacles on the avenue of approach. Perhaps in his
overconfidence and arrogance, he thought this routine military precaution
was unnecessary. Even a few men on horseback could have brought
Leopold vital information that he was marching into an ambush, and the
Duke soon learned a hard lesson about the grave risks of underestimating
the Swiss.
The Schwyers and their allies deployed on the uphill side of the road,
which led past the Morgarten Mountain. These forces were spread out along
this route, so they could strike a large section of the approaching column
simultaneously. The Habsburg army marched along this road in the
predawn light of morning, when the Swiss struck. In one of the earliest
accounts of the action, the attackers, having allowed the Duke to advance
into a trap, immediately "sprang forward from the mountain just like
mountain goats, throwing stones, killing most [of the defenders], who were
in no way able to defend [themselves] or to escape." 51
The tactic of throwing stones at the beginning of an attack was often
used by the Swiss early in their history, which was the case later, in 1339
at the Battle of Laupen .52 The stratagem of hurling stones was a crude form
of fighting because the accuracy of thrown rocks was poor, and this tactic
could only be used at very close range. Likely, stones were used by the
Swiss who had few weapons cable of killing at a distance such as
crossbows. The rocks thrown at Morgarten could have helped confuse the
enemy and might have done some damage, but this barrage of stones was
of short duration, and the Swiss soon advanced to meet their adversaries.
The Swiss attacked rapidly on the slippery slopes using their iron
footgear for traction, but the Habsburg forces were caught completely out
of their element, and the initial attack swept through the knights so rapidly
that they were unable to give any effective resistance. The Swiss advanced
courageously from their hiding places and enclosed their enemies "just as
fish in a net and killed them without resistance [being offered]." 53 The
observation that the Habsburg forces were ensnared in groups helps clarify
how the Schwyzers and their allies fought the battle. Clearly, the Swiss
enjoyed some tactical flexibility in their units of 100, 200, and 300 troops,
and they may have used these sections to mass men at critical junctures to
dissect Leopold's column. Once the line of knights was broken into
51

Johann von Yictring as cited in Liebenau, p. 24. "Duci introitum concesserunt ... et quasi
ihices de montihus scandentes /abides miserunt, plurimos occiderunt, qui se defendere neque
evade re ullo modo potuerunt." The account dates from 1340.
52
Justinger, p. 89.
53
Johannes von Winterthur, p. 72. "Animati et valde cordati contra eos descendunt de
latibulis .m is et eos quasi pisces in sagena conc/usos invadunt et sine omni resistencia
occidunt."
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sections, the Swiss easily surrounded these groups and destroyed them.
These tactics made sense because they allowed the Swiss to keep in close
proximity to each other, preserve unit cohesion, and maintain the ability to
deploy for further action. If the Schwyzers and their allies were simply
spread along the slopes, then the ability to redirect their activities would
have been lost once the initial onrush had been made.

Battle of Morgarten by E. Yan Muyden

The Swiss used their halberds to cut down the knights , and they "s lew
both lords and horses." 54 As platforms from which the cavalrymen could
fight, the mounts were also military targets. The Swiss so rapidly cut down
their enemies that Johannes von Winterthur stated, "It was not a battle but
only ... a butchery." Duke Leopold 's men were just like "sacrificial animals
brought to slaughter." The Swi ss spared no one, took no prisoners, and cut
down their enemies "without [class] distinction" (ind(fferenter ). 55 Social
divisions were often significant on the battlefields of Europe in this era
because many of the knights were wealthy, and these men were often taken
captive and held for ransom. In something like a gentleman's agreement,
54

Hans Gloggner·s Zi.ircher Chronik as cited in Liebenau, p. 34. ··oa warent swit~er uf dem

berg und sluogen herren und ross."
55

Johannes von Winterthur, p. 73 . "Non era! pu11g11a se 1a11111111 ... quasi mac1C11io."
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the upper classes were willing to take prisoners of their social equals hoping
for the same treatment in return. This meant that combat was less dangerous
for them than the men from the lower classes. By killing these knights
without consideration of status or wealth, the Swiss made a social as well
as a military statement.
The Schwyzers and their allies directed the initial attack against the
knights, the most-feared adversaries, but they also struck the men on foot.
Pressing their advantage, the Swiss rolled up much of the Habsburg column
by attacking down the line of marching men. Possibly, the Swiss also
attacked the enemy infantry near the lake at the same time they
overwhelmed the cavalry. Leopold's foot soldiers soon panicked, lost unit
cohesion, and any semblance of resistance rapidly crumbled. Another factor
in the loss of discipline among the infantry was the flight of the knights.
When the Swiss attacked the nobles, many of these men turned to run away
and trampled their own men killing many of them. "When the servants of
the Duke saw [the attack] they all turned back and fled from there. And the
first one to flee was Count Hainrich [Heinrich] von Montfort, the canon,
who killed many [of the Duke's] men [on foot) with [his] horses." 56 Only
the contingent of fifty men from Zurich made the mistake of attempting to
hold their position because they "did not want to flee" (woltend nit fliehen ),
but their courage was misspent, and they were all killed in the onrush. Their
bodies lay close together (by einandren) or were piled upon each other. 57
The foot soldiers at the front of the column suffered the heaviest casualties,
and more men farther back survived. Only one man from the town of
Winterthur died because he got separated from the other men and joined the
nobles farther forward. 58
Desperate to save themselves from the onslaught of their adversaries,
the men in the Habsburg army tried to escape by retreating back up the
road. At times, the fleeing men were so pressed together in their panic that
"they could neither defend themselves nor flee." 59 The attack pushed many
men into the lake where they drowned being weighed down by clothing and
armor. Others jumped into the lake attempting to swim to the opposite shore
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Zurich Chronik ( 1428) as cited in Liebanau, p. 32. "Do das des hertzogen diener ersachent,
do kartent si sich all umb, undfluchent dahin, und der erst der.floch, der war graff Hain rich
von Montfort, der corherr, der vii volks ertot mit den rossen." See also Heinrich Brennwald
and Aegidius (Gilg) Tschudi as cited in Liebenau, pp. 47, 63 respectively.
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Zurcher Chronik (1449) as cited in Liebenau , p. 35. See also, Gloggner as cited in
Liebanau, p. 34. "Und verlurent die von zurichjlinzig man."
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Johannes von Winterthur, p. 73.
59
Victring, as cited in Liebenau, p. 24. "Qui se defendere neque evadere ullo nwdo
potuerunt."
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and risked drowning rather than face the wrath of the Swiss. 60 The water in
November was very cold, and the lake was one mile (1.5 kilometers) or
more across, so few survived. The forty-five men from Aarau, who came by
boat, rushed to the vessel, but the craft sank under their weight, and they all
drowned. 61
While escape was difficult, many survived including Duke Leopold,
who evaded death because an aide saw an avenue of flight. "The Duke,
himself having been informed by one who had observed a path [to use to]
get away, escaped with difficulty." Leopold was fortunate, but his casualties
were heavy. In fact, "the flower of the army" (jlos militie) had been killed. 62
"From each community, castle, and town there were many men killed and
because of that everywhere ... only the voice of crying and wailing was
heard." 63 The names of over fifty prominent nobles who fell in the battle
were recorded in the Swiss books of remembrance (Jahrzeitbiicher), but
there may have been many more. Friedrich von Toggenburg, who may have
warned the Swiss of the approach of Leopold's army, was among the
dead. 64 The total number killed in the Habsburg Army was roughly 2,000
men. Johannes von Winterthur stated that 1500 had been killed by the
sword, but he added that this number did not include those who drowned.
Mathias von Neuenburg also wrote that 1500 men had fallen, and Twinger
von Konigshofen stated that roughly 1500 knights and their attendants and
500 infantry were also killed. 65
In comparison, the Swiss losses were few. One erroneous source
reported that the Schwyzers lost "no more than one man." 66 A careful
modem study has stated that seven men from Schwyz lost their lives, while
another seven men from the Uri and Unterwalden contingents were also
killed. 67 The victory for the Swiss at Morgarten was such a lopsided contest
that it may be considered among the greatest achievements in the entire
history of warfare.
60

This is one of the best documented aspects of the battle see Justinger, p. 48, Johannes von
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As a young boy in school, Johannes von Winterthur saw "with my own
eyes" (occulis meis conspexi) the men returning to Winterthur with some
anxiety because he feared for the life of his father. Johannes finally saw his
father, and, with great excitement, the boy ran to meet him in front of the
city gate. The young scholar also saw Leopold return after the battle, and
the Duke seemed understandably overcome with grief, worry, and
exhaustion. 68
While the battle of Morgarten destroyed one Habsburg army, the other
invasion force continued to advance on Unterwalden. The men of Schwyz,
and the contingent from Unterwalden that had fought at Morgarten, left the
battlefield rapidly to deploy against the remaining menace, but this effort
was unnecessary. Otto von Strassberg and his men had skirmished
insignificantly with enemy forces, but, when the leader received a glove or
gauntlet turned inside out, he knew that Leopold's army had been defeated
and immediately abandoned the campaign by withdrawing his troops .69 But
Otto was among the casualties of these engagements. He suffered some kind
of internal wound (lesus intrinsecus) and soon died. 70
Once all threats of invasion had turned back, the Swiss returned to the
battlefield to plunder the enemy dead, no doubt gaining considerable wealth
in the process. The victors took weapons and armor from the fallen men and
horses, and they also retrieved corpses from the lake to take anything of
value from them. This effort was so thorough that few artifacts relating to
the engagement have been found on the battlefield. Scores of important
nobles had been killed, and their relatives retrieved many of these bodies to
inter them in family vaults. 71
Since the contest between the Swiss and the forces of Duke Leopold
was only a part of a much wider conflict, the hostilities continued after
Morgarten. However, the advantage had gone to the victors of the battle,
and they soon went on the offensive striking late in 1315 and in the spring
of 1316. The men of U nterwalden attacked Interlaken, and forces from
Schwyz also struck at Glarus largely for plunder. The Swiss and the
Habsburgs signed a series of armistices that ran from 1318 to 1323, which
effectively brought the fighting between them to an end. 72 Frederick von
Habsburg's bid for the throne of Germany ended at the battle of Mtihldorf
in 1322 when he was captured by his enemies. Among the conditions of his

68

Johannes von Winterthur, p. 73.
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release in 1325 was the renunciation of Frederick's claim to the office of
Emperor. 73
On 9 Dec. I 315, only twenty-four days after the battle, representatives
of the Forest States concluded a defensive alliance at Brunnen in the state
of Schwyz. The "Brunnen Treaty" (Brunnen Vertrag) remains one of the
most important agreements ever made among the Swiss. It bound the three
states to cooperate on any military ventures, to come to one another' s aid
in time of emergencies, to guarantee peace among the signers, and to assure
cooperation on all matters dealing with foreign powers. Significantly, this
accord would "remain eternally and continuously" (ewig und stete beliben)
binding on the states, and it is still in force today. 74 While the authenticity
of the Federal Charter of 1291 may be in question, the Brunnen Treaty
appears to be genuine. Although the existence of the Federal Charter was
unknown until the eighteenth century, the Brunnen Treaty has been
remembered since it was signed, and it may be the oldest authentic
agreement of an "eternal" nature among the Swiss. The victory at
Morgarten made the Brunnen Treaty possible, because the viability of
cooperation among the Forest States had been clearly confirmed. The
victors in the battle soon attracted the interest of other states nearby, and
Luzern joined the alliance in 1332 followed by Zurich (1351), Zug and
Glarus (both 1352), and Bern ( 1353 ). The Forest States and these new allies
formed the "Eight Old States" (Acht Alten Orte), which became the
configuration of the Swiss Confederation during most of the later Middle
Ages. These states, held together by the Brunnen Treaty of 1315 and later
alliances, maintained the viability of the Confederation allowing it
eventually to evolve into the modern Swiss nation.
In a stunning feat of arms at Morgarten, the free Swiss peasants
defeated a competent feudal army led by mounted knights in one of the
most lopsided battles in history. This victory was among the first of its kind,
and it signaled the development of infantries and the decline of cavalries in
the armies of Europe. Over the next two centuries, the Swiss would
continually demonstrate how free men could protect themselves and secure
their privileges by their military prowess.
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